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Beyond methods and models. Semiotics as a distinctive discipline and an 
intellectual traditioni 
Abstract 
Such familiar characterisations of semiotics as being a method, a model, an interdisciplinary 
perspective, or a philosophical movement are inadequate, because semiotics itself 
comprehends many models, methods, and philosophical perspectives, and it is just one of the 
many enterprises which may be seen as occupying a space intermediate to the traditional 
sciences. Semiotics must be considered a science in its own right, defined by a particular point 
of view, rather than a domain of reality. As such it is in many ways comparable to cognitive 
science. A distinct advantage of cognitive science is being by definition a confluence of 
different research traditions, whereas semiotics has long been hampered by the autonomy 
postulate. On the other hand, cognitive science still seems to be stuck in an epistemological 
impasse, just as semiotics was at the time of structuralism. Cognitive semiotics could be a 
promising way out of both quandaries. 
 




Semiotics, often confused with structuralism and/or the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, is 
customarily presented as a (series of) model(s) or methods – or a particular brand of 
philosophy. Elsewhere, I have argued that semiotics cannot be considered to be some kind of 
method, a “model”, a particular philosophical tradition, or even an “interdisciplinary 
perspective”, whatever that may mean; nor is it simply a critique of ideology or a “meta-
analysis”; but it must be taken to be a science in its own right (cf. Sonesson 1992; 1993a, b; 
1994a, b; 1996a). This seems to leave us with only one way of looking at the interplay between 
semiotics and other enterprises such as art history, literary history, general history, archaeology, 
psychology, sociology, and so on: that semiotics may function as an ancillary science to any of 
them, just as they may play the same part in relation to semiotics, when the latter is pursuing its 
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own aims. In the following, I will take a somewhat more sceptical stance concerning the 
possibilities of semiotics for becoming a science; but I will do so for historical and social, rather 
than systemic, reasons. And, in the end, I will offer the new paradigm of cognitive semiotics as a 
way forward – a way to arrive finally at that position which, according to Saussure, was 
prepared beforehand.  
Out of the semiotical soup shops: Semiotics and Philosophy 
From an epistemological point of view, it seems rather simple to ascertain that semiotics can in 
no way be a method or a model. Not to overburden our argument, let us define a method as a 
series of operations which might be applied in ordered stages to an object of study, with the goal 
of yielding information of a particular kind about the object studied; and let us similarly decide 
that a model is a simplified, but still more or less iconic, representation of the object studied 
which can be more easily manipulated than the real thing, and which (ideally) has the advantage 
of representing classes of objects of a particular category, rather than a single object, so that, 
when methodological operations are applied to it, it yields information about the category of 
objects concerned.  
It should be obvious that semiotics cannot offer anything of the kind – or, rather, it offers 
too much of it. For semiotics, just as all other sciences, contains a wealth of models, as well as a 
panoply of methods. When one particular model and/or method is attributed to semiotics, it is 
obviously being confused with one of its manifestations having course during some particular 
period, most probably the movement know as French structuralism, which was popular in the 
1960:ies and 70:ies, but which has since lost its relevance in most quarters. It may rightly be said 
about French structuralism that it tried (mostly in vain) to apply a linguistic model (itself 
abusively derived from the linguistic structuralism developed, notably, by Saussure and 
Hjelmslev), as well as to implement (but completely failing to do so) the method of the same 
linguistic school. 
Semiotics as such is not restricted to any single method, but is known to have used several 
kinds, such as an exhaustive analysis of concrete texts, or text analysis (comparable to 
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distributional analysis in linguistics and “explication de texte” in literary studies), as well as 
classical experimental technique (well-known from psychology) and imaginary variation of 
properties, or system analysis, reminiscent of the kind of reasoning found in philosophy, most 
explicitly in phenomenology. In addition, semiotics has employed a hybrid form of text analysis 
and imaginary variation, which I have elsewhere called text classification, notably in semiotically 
inspired rhetoric (cf. Sonesson 1992a; 1996a).ii Nor is semiotics necessarily dependant on a 
model taken over from linguistics, as is often believed, although the construction of models 
remains one of its peculiar features, if it is compared to most of the human sciences. Indeed, 
semiotics differs from traditional approaches to humanitas, whose domain it may partly seem 
to occupy, in employing models that guide its practitioners in their effort to bring about 
adequate analyses, instead of simply relying on the power of the “innocent eye”. After having 
borrowed its models from linguistics, philosophy, medicine, and mathematics, semiotics is now 
well on its way to the elaboration of its proper models (cf. Sonesson 1992a, c; 1993a, 1994a, 
1996a, 1998). 
Nor should we adopt the popular preconception, according to which the semiotic field is 
inhabited simply by the followers of Peirce and Saussure. In the first place, there would be no 
reason (more than a superficial terminological coincidence) to amalgamate two such dissimilar 
doctrines as those represented by the elaborate but fragmentary philosophy of Peirce, and the 
marginal, if suggestive, annotations of Saussure. But, more importantly, in adopting this point of 
view, we would be unable to account, not only for the semiotical work accomplished well 
before the time of our two cultural heroes, be it that of the stoics, Augustin, the scholastics, 
Locke, Leibniz, or the ideologues, but also for much of contemporary semiotics, some parts of 
which are not particularly indebted to any of the forefathers. 
In an article in which he says many sensible things in defence of semiotics, Umberto Eco 
(1988: 323ff) comes up with a very strange conception of what the latter is: on the one hand, he 
admits that there are certain specific semiotic sciences, such as those which study the 
interpretative habits of events in verbal language, gestures, traffic signs, pictures, and so on; on 
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the other hand, he claims that there is a general semiotics, which simply postulates the concept 
of sign, thus permitting us to speak about superficially dissimilar things within a unified 
framework. The latter, he maintains, is not a science, but a philosophical activity, and this is in 
his view demonstrated by the very proliferation of different conceptions of what semiotics is. 
Indeed, he goes on to say, it is a variety of the philosophy of language, which has the 
particularity of going beyond the study of statements, to the underlying activity, and which does 
not limit itself to a single semiotic system, verbal language.  
It is interesting that Eco should admit that the studies concerned with specific semiotic 
phenomena are sciences; but that is no doubt because some of these sciences existed well 
before modern semiotics was in the works. The study of verbal language, for instance, has long 
been known as philology or linguistics. In some cases, however, this conception would require 
the establishment of new disciplines: there is, for instance no well-accepted branch of 
knowledge involved with the study of gesture, which is still treated within anthropology or 
psychology, or under the absurd and misleading heading of “non-verbal communication”. The 
semiotics of pictorial signs is even more in need of being established as an independent 
discipline, because art history has never been interested in pictures as such, but only in a series 
of pictures considered each in turn, and the findings of recent perceptual psychology have to be 
brought into contact with more systematic studies, similarly to the way in which post-
Chomskyan linguistics has been related to psycholinguistics. The rudiments of a body of 
knowledge corresponding to a semiotics of pictures already exist; but it can hardly be 
considered a well-established discipline. 
This part of Eco’s thesis was actually formulated well before him by Luis Prieto (1975a,b), 
who argued that disciplines such as anthropology, ethnology, sociology, psychology, literary 
history, art history, history of religion, archaeology, and so on, should more aptly be called the 
“semiotic sciences”, rather than being distributed among the social sciences and the 
humanities, because what they have in common is that they are involved with meaning. Eco 
(1988: 351) himself points out that while the natural sciences are interpretations of the first 
degree, the semiotic sciences are interpretations of interpretations. The latter, undoubtedly, 
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also applies to what archaeology does with artefacts left in some prehistoric burial; it may not 
apply to the radiocarbon dating of these artefacts, but it certainly applies to the interpretative 
frame in which the resulting dates are later inserted and given a meaning. More obviously, it 
applies to most things done in art history, though, once again, the study of artistic materials is 
only indirectly contained within this description, because of the chemical analyses being made 
on substances defined for an “artistic” purpose.  
But Prieto allowed general semiotics to subsist and to remain a science, although at 
another level of generality. Although Prieto is not very clear about the nature of this general 
semiotic theory, his own work within the domain seems to imply the conviction that it should 
not only furnish the semiotic sciences with a coherent framework, before the specific disciplines 
can accomplish their task, but that it would also be called upon to compare the results of these 
disciplines, in order to determine how different resources for conveying signification may differ. 
Whether or not this common framework consists in the concept of sign, or if something 
different, or something additional, is needed, it seems strange to say that this framework is 
simply “postulated” by a philosophical movement, as Eco maintains. If so, all these disciplines 
would only be valid, given a particular philosophical framework, and for someone not sharing 
this framework, all these particular domains of study would have nothing to contribute. In the 
end, then, specific semiotics would also be given over to the whim of philosophy. 
Curiously, Eco even claims that the fact of there being different semiotical points of view 
demonstrates that semiotics is a philosophical activity; but, at the very least, this would show 
that semiotics is a class of different philosophical and/or scientific activities. Actually, a much 
more natural conclusion would be that, just as sociology, psychology, archaeology, literary 
history, and so on, semiotics can be practised from the point of view of different philosophical 
conceptions. Thus, there may be a structuralist semiotics, a nominalist semiotics, a 
phenomenological semiotics, and so on – just as there may be, for instance, a processural and a 
post-processural archaeology, a positivist and a post-modernist art history, and so on. 
The way to get out of the “philosophical soup shops”, to adopt Peirce’s phrase, is to bring 
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semiotics itself out of them. All sciences have once separated themselves from philosophy – a 
process that of course (as we shall see) always leaves a residue in the tureen.iii 
Those who look upon semiotics as a method or a model undoubtedly themselves take up 
a position outside of semiotics. Eco’s claims, however, are made from within semiotics itself. A 
more commonly voiced point of view among people closely involved with semiotics is that it is 
“an interdisciplinary perspective”. I find it difficult to see the point of that description. Either it 
means that people representing a lot of other more well-established disciplines come together 
at semiotic congresses; but, if so, it does not describe any situation which is original to 
semiotics, and there is no reason for this state of facts having to determine the future of any 
discipline. Or it really means that semiotics itself is something “in-between” other disciplines. If 
so, that is not particularly new either: from social psychology to cognitive science, other 
disciplines have been born out of such an intermediate space. This also means that the phrase 
cannot describe the particularity of semiotics: there are a lot of other “interdisciplinary 
perspectives”. So, at the very least, something needs to be added to this definition. 
A more sophisticated version of this description is Paul Bouissac’s (1998: 1999a, b) claim 
that semiotics is mainly involved with “meta-analysis”, which “consists in reading through a 
large number of specialised scientific publications, selected among the published literature in 
one or several domains of inquiry, and of relating the partial results within a more 
encompassing model than the ones that are held by the various specialists concerned” (1999a: 
4). This is indeed something which semioticians tend to do; but so do of course a lot of people 
working within cognitive science and a lot of other purportedly “interdisciplinary perspectives”. 
We are still left with the question what the specificity of semiotics is. It cannot lie in that “more 
encompassing model”, for we have seen that semiotics is more than a model, since it makes use 
of a lot of them. Of course, it may contain a class of more wide-ranging models. But in order to 
contain models, it must be something else: a science.  
So what, then, is the central framework provided by a semiotic “meta-analysis”? Not 
simply the postulated concept of sign, as Eco suggests. I would be the first to agree with 
Bouissac (1998) that the notion of sign is insufficiently defined in semiotics. In fact, I have often 
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argued that both the central traditions, the Peircean as well as the Saussurean, simply 
presuppose the essential components of the sign (cf. Sonesson 1989a; 1992a,b; 1996a). 
Contrary to Bouissac, however, I think the concept of sign makes perfectly good sense, once it 
has been properly defined (cf. Sonesson 1989a; 1992a,b; in press). Itself a fruit of meta-analysis, 
my definition abundantly refers to ontogeny, as well as to phylogeny. However, this does not 
mean that the concept of sign is sufficient to define the domain of semiotics, which has to be 
much wider, at least because signs cannot be treated independently of a wider concept of 
meaning.  
According to Saussure, semiotics (or semiology as he called it) was to study “the life of 
signs in society”; and our second mythical founding-father, Peirce, as well as his forerunner John 
Locke, conceived of semiotics as being the “doctrine of signs”. Later in life, however, Peirce 
came to prefer the wider term “mediation” as a description of the subject matter of semiotics 
(cf. Parmentier 1985). And Saussure actually argued that in the semiotic sciences, there was no 
object to be studied except for the point of view that we adopt on other objects (see Sonesson 
1989a,I.1.4.). More recently, Greimas has rejected the notion of sign, and his followers Floch 
(1986) and Thürlemann (1982; 1990) have argued the case in the domain of pictorial semiotics. 
In a similar fashion, Eco (1976) himself, at the end of his tortuous critique of iconicity, 
substituted the notion of sign process for the traditional sign concept.  
So there seems to be wide agreement within semiotics, although with somewhat different 
slants, that the sign (also termed the semiotic function) is not comprehensive enough to delimit 
the field of semiotics: rather, the domain of semiotics is meaning (or “mediation”), in some 
wider, yet to be specified sense. However, since everything, or almost everything, may be 
endowed with meaning, any object whatsoever (or almost) may enter into the domain of 
semiotics, but only in so far as it is studied from the point of view of its capacity for conveying 
meaning. Semiotics, I will contend, is not about what something means; it is about how it 
means. 
Two ways of defining sciences: Semiotics vs. the History of Religion 
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So far, I have tried to characterise complex notions such as method, model, movements, and so 
on, in very simple terms, sufficient to rule out the possibility of semiotics being one of those 
things. Now we face the even more daunting task of trying to determine what a science is. As a 
first approximation, one may want to say that a science is a particularly orderly and systematic 
fashion for describing and analysing or, more generally, interpreting a certain part of reality, 
using different methods and models. At this point we may want to introduce a division between 
natural sciences, on the one hand, and social and human (or, better, semiotic) sciences, on the 
other, which, following a traditional hermeneutical conception echoed by Eco (1988: 351), 
separates the interpretation of facts from the interpretation of interpretations. Normally, it is 
added that the first kind of knowledge involves phenomena for which laws may be formulated, 
while the second kind only refer to unique occurrences; and that while the second type may be 
understood, the first can only be explained. As we will see, this is largely a pre-semiotic 
conception. 
But there is something seriously wrong with this analysis, even at its earliest stage. Not all 
sciences appear to have their own reserved piece of reality to study. It seems to me that 
sciences may be defined either as being preoccupied with a particular domain of reality, or as 
applying a particular point of view to the whole of reality (which is really one and the same). 
Thus, French studies are involved with French language and literature, linguistics with all 
languages (or what is common to all languages); similarly, the history of religions describes a 
very particular domain of reality, religion, as it evolves through history (and pre-history). Even 
within the natural sciences, there are some sciences that have their particular domains, such as 
geography, astronomy, and meteorology. This seems to be even more obviously true of such 
applied sciences as medicine and dentistry. 
But there is no semiotic domain, just as there is no psychological or sociological one: 
rather, everything may be studied from the point of view of its semiotic, as well as its 
psychological, or sociological properties. We find the same thing in the natural sciences: 
chemistry and physics often appear to be different points of view taken on the very same 
matter.iv This is not the whole truth: in fact semiotics, psychology and sociology only apply their 
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points of view to the human world, or at least to the world of living beings (in most cases, to 
animals, not to plants). So the point-of-view approach is supplemented by a domain-approach. 
The domain of chemistry and physics is much wider: its goes well beyond the human world. But 
both apply the same point of view to the human world and what lies behind it, which is 
impossible for semiotics, as well as for psychology and sociology. Contrary to chemistry and 
physics, biology is not just another point of view, but it is also domain-specific: it only involves 
living creatures. This may explain that there is now such a speciality as biosemiotics but not (at 
least I hope so) chemical semiotics. 
In the following, then, semiotics will be taken to be a science, the point of view of which 
may be applied to any phenomenon produced by the human race or, more widely, by living 
beings.v This point of view consists, in Saussurean terms, in an investigation of the point of view 
itself, which is equivalent, in Peircean terms, to the study of mediation. In other words, 
semiotics is concerned with the different forms and conformations given to the means through 
which humankind believe itself to have access to “the world”. This is at least the way I have 
formulated the task of semiotics in my earlier work. For many reasons (which have been clear 
with the emergence of cognitive science and biosemiotics), it now seems impossible to limit 
semiotics only to the way the human world is endowed with meaning. Even when discussing 
pictures, which are peculiar to human beings, we can only understand their specificity in 
contrast to meanings handled by other animals. It will therefore be better to avoid any kind of 
belief-predicates in the characterization of semiotics. Thus, semiotics should here be said to be 
concerned with the different forms and conformations given to the means through which living 
beings are observed, through their interactions with it, to have access to “the world”.  
The very term “point of view” is of course a visual metaphor. Yet the point, which is a 
standpoint, matters more than the sense modality. For, in studying these phenomena, semiotics 
should occupy the standpoint of humankind itself (and of its different fractions). Indeed, as 
Saussure argues, semiotic objects exist merely as those points of view that are adopted on 
other, “material” objects, which is why these points of view cannot be altered without the result 
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being the disappearance of the semiotic objects as such. Analogously, is has been argued that 
we should have to adapt the point of view of the bat, let alone the tick, but it is not clear that 
this can be done in the same sense. 
Taking the point of view of the users, and trying to explain their particular use, we cannot, 
like the philosopher Nelson Goodman (1968), reject the folk notion of picture because of its 
incoherence, but must discover its peculiar systematicity. But it does not follow, as Prieto 
(1975a) would claim, that we must restrict our study to the knowledge shared by all users of the 
system, for it is necessary to descend at least one level of analysis below the ultimate level of 
which the user is aware, in order to take account of the presuppositions underlying the use of 
the system. Semiotics must go beyond the standpoint of the user, to explain the workings of 
such operative, albeit tacit, knowledge that underlies the behavior constitutive of any system of 
signification (cf. Sonesson 1989a, I.1.4). 
Moreover, semiotics is devoted to these phenomena considered in their qualitative 
aspects rather than the quantitative ones, and it is geared to rules and regularities, instead of 
unique objects. This is to say that, pictorial semiotics, like all semiotic sciences, including 
linguistics, is a nomothetic science, a science which is concerned with generalities, not an 
idiographic science, comparable to art history and most other traditional human sciences, which 
take as their object an array of singular phenomena, the common nature and connectedness of 
which they take for granted. I would like to insist on this combination here, since it overrides the 
traditional divide between the humanities and other sciences, postulated by the hermeneutical 
tradition from Dilthey and Weber to Habermas and Apel: even a well-established semiotical 
discipline such as linguistics, including the study of any particular language, involves the 
establishment of laws and regularities, not individual facts. Just like linguistics, but contrary to 
the natural sciences and to some varieties of the social sciences, all semiotic sciences are 
concerned with qualities, rather than quantities – that is, they are concerned with categories 
more than numbers. Thus, semiotics shares with the social and natural sciences the character of 
being a law-seeking, or nomothetic, rather than an idiographic, science, while retaining the 
emphasis on categories, to the detriment of amounts, which is peculiar to the human sciences. 
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Being nomothetic and qualitative, pictorial semiotics has as its principal theme a category that 
may be termed pictorality, or picturehood – which is a peculiar version of iconicity.vi  
In the small article on which rests Ernst Cassirer's (1972:91) principal claim to being a 
pioneer of semiotics, he declares that “linguistics is part of semiotics, not of physics”. This, 
however, is all he has to say about semiotics. The bulk of the text is taken up by a much more 
classical discussion: whether linguistics is to be considered part of the Geisteswissenschaften or 
the Naturwissenschaften. Cassirer has learnt the lesson of the Prague school well: he quotes 
Trubetzkoy’s opposition between phonetics which is concerned with material facts, such a 
sound vibrations, or the movement of the speech organs, and phonology which is concerned 
with “incorporeal things”, that is, as Cassirer (1972: 90) points of, with units determined by 
meaning. Not only the segmentation of the world, but also that of the outer form of language, 
depends on a “world-view”: it is the effect of the double Saussurean cut through two 
amorphous masses, those of thought and sound. Phonology, then, and the whole of linguistics, 
is a Geisteswissenshaft. More importantly, however, Cassirer observers that, in this whole 
methodological struggle (for instance in the work of Dilthey and Rickert), “the fact that there is 
such a thing as human speech and that there is such a thing as linguistics was never mentioned” 
(1972:89). He does not hesitate to qualify this as “a very regrettable fact, a sin of omission that 
could not fail to have its consequences”. Nowadays, it may be added that, as linguistics has now 
been generalized to a series of particular semiotical sciences, such as pictorial semiotics, gesture 
studies, cultural semiotics, and so on, the result of neglecting these domains of study in the 
theory of knowledge are even more dire. 
Strange to say, linguistics and other semiotical domains, as particular kinds of 
epistemological practices, were still ignored in the middle of the 20th century, during the new 
Methodenstreit, in the works of Gadamer, Habermas, Luhmann and others. In fact, many of 
these thinkers (as is also true of Dilthey) attribute much importance to language in other 
respects (as does, for instance Habermas, with his ideal speech situation), and yet they do not 
take the peculiarities of the semiotic sciences into account. They fail to realize that linguistics, 
288 
 
Signs vol. 2: pp. 277-319, 2008 
ISSN: 1902-8822 
 
and other semiotical sciences conducted on this model, do not really correspond to either the 
description of the natural or the cultural sciences. 
Unfortunately, Cassirer himself does not seem to take this peculiarity into account. In 
another publication, which is specifically dedicated to the study of the nature of the cultural 
sciences, Cassirer (1942: 63ff) takes exception to the simplistic opposition usually proposed 
between the natural and cultural sciences, claiming that general concepts are needed also in the 
latter. He starts out exemplifying this with linguistics which, in Humboldt’s terms, studies the 
differences between the varying inner language forms, such as languages, like many Indo-
European ones, which distinguish masculine, feminine and neutral gender in the nouns, and 
those which separate noun classes according to other criteria. He then goes on to discuss art 
history, exemplifying its general terms with Wölfflin’s opposition between the picturesque and 
the linear style. However, if we consider linguistic research as it is really conducted, it is very 
different from art history, even supposing that thinkers like Wölfflin and Riegl had had more 
success in introducing their general concepts to the discipline as it is really practiced. Whether 
linguistics is concerned with universals of language (mentioned by Cassirer 1972:83, with 
reference to Jakobson), or it simply has the aim of formulating the phonological, grammatical 
and semantical rules of a given language, it is involved with something general, not with 
individual facts. Even as analysis of conversation (the Saussurean “linguistique de la parole”), 
linguistics is interested in formulating general rules. Historical linguistics, which may still have 
appeared as a more important part of linguistics in Cassirer’s time, is certainly involved in a 
sense with singular facts, such as the dates at which certain language changes occur. But even in 
the pioneering days of Grimm and Paul, historical linguistics was very much dedicated to 
formulating rules of language change. Art history, even in the radical version of Wölfflin, only 
uses general facts as regulatory concepts for the studies of individual items. That is why art 
history is not pictorial semiotics. 
Cassirer (1942:65) may however by right in claiming that the general concepts involved in 
the cultural sciences are neither nomothetic nor ideographic, in the sense often given to these 
terms. They are not nomothetic, he says, because in the cultural sciences, individual 
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phenomena cannot be deduced from general laws. And they are not ideographic, because they 
cannot be reduced to history. This is of course the distinction I have tried to account for in 
distinguishing the nomothetic and qualitative sciences of semiosis from the nomothetic and 
quantitative sciences of nature.  
 
The social institution of science: Semiotics vs. Archaeology 
This is as far as I have taken the argument in earlier articles. But there is certainly something 
wrong with this reasoning. When he suggested the creation of “semiology”, Saussure claimed 
that its place among the sciences was prepared beforehand. Ironically, a century later, semiotics 
still does not exist as an independent discipline, apart from a few universities such as Lund, 
Tartu and Bologna. It certainly has more of an existence as collaborative networks between 
institutes and countries in different parts of the world, as partial definitions of research 
positions, and of course in the form of numerous associations, congresses, reviews, and books. 
But, clearly, something tells us that the place of semiotics was not as well-prepared as Saussure 
imagined. 
In contrast, archaeology is today a well-established science, represented, as a matter of 
course, at most universities, and occupying a pride of place among those endeavors founded by 
state, regional, and even international, institutions.vii That is no doubt as is should be, for 
archaeology, in its different avatars, has contributed a great amount of knowledge about human 
culture and behavior through the ages. And yet, at least with the aid of the simple 
epistemological model we have used so far, it is difficult to say what archaeology is all about. If 
there is some particular archaeological domain of study, it is hard to discern it; and if there is a 
peculiar archaeological point of view, it is not easy to define. 
This is hardly surprising: after all, archaeology emerged rather recently, not, as most 
disciplines, out of philosophy, but from what, on first sight, may seem an unholy alliance of 
travelers and adventurers (often with diplomatic passports), on one hand, and of museologists 
290 
 
Signs vol. 2: pp. 277-319, 2008 
ISSN: 1902-8822 
 
and other specialists in classification, on the other (cf. Bahn ed. 1996; Trigger 1989). According 
to a common suggestion, archaeology is about “prehistory”, which is then characterized as the 
period before the advent of writing (cf. Fagan 1998:4f). If so, is this a domain of study, or a 
particular point of view? It would be the former, if it meant that archaeology was dedicated to 
the description of a world in which writing did not exist; if would be the second, if it meant that 
archaeology involves the description of the world as it appears when we only have recourse to 
knowledge not transmitted through writing. The latter description undoubtedly seems most 
promising from a semiotic point of view: it would imply that archaeology only describes the 
world as it can be recovered by means of information conveyed by a particular kind of semiotic 
vehicle.  
Fagan implicitly appears to opt for the latter alternative: he says archaeology is concerned 
with periods in which most people are not literate, so that much new knowledge may be gained 
from excavation. Moreover, he proceeds to oppose “text-aided archaeology” to “prehistoric 
archaeology”.viii However, it seems that a lot of archaeology would then turn out to be of the 
hybrid kind: in fact, “text-aided archaeology” would not only include the study of, for instance, 
the castles erected during the Middle Ages, but also, within the domain of “industrial 
archaeology”, of near-contemporary buildings (cf. Renfrew & Bahn 1991).ix In the second place, 
the very effect of archaeological work may then be to make some phenomenon cease being an 
object of study for archaeology and being transformed into a subject matter of some other 
branch of learning, such as history. Thus, Mayan studies would suddenly stop being 
archaeological, once it was discovered that the Ancient Maya had true writing. Perhaps we 
could live with this later consequence. But there is a third objection, which may turn out to be 
more serious: it is not obvious that there is such a clear-cut difference between true writing 
systems and different kind of “pre-writing” that is allows for the distribution of the past into two 
or more domains of study (cf. Bouissac 1997: Rudgley 1998). 
Fagan (1998: 4f) also offers a second criterion: archaeology, as opposed to history, “is, 
most of the time, entirely anonymous”. Perhaps it is some similar idea that explains that 
Renfrew & Bahn (2000: 11) describe archaeology as ”’the past tense of cultural anthropology’” 
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(their quotation marks), not, for instance, of history. If, so, like Fagan, they are referring to a 
rather antiquated (but still dominant) conception of history, pre-dating the preoccupation, 
initiated by the Annales school, with enduring structures and long-time developments. Once 
again, this conception seems to have the effect of allowing archaeology itself to transform 
something into the subject matter of another science. To pick the same example, as long as 
everybody accepted the opinion of Sir Eric Thompson, according to which Mayan writing was 
only concerned with astronomical events, Mayan studies were part of archaeology, but now 
that we know that the inscriptions on many stelae concern highly individual “lords” of different 
Mayan cities, as well as the wars they waged on each others, the subject would cease being 
archaeological. Quite apart from this embarrassing situation, not only do recent, “post-
processural” thinkers such as Hodder (1991) argue that archaeology should be more concerned 
with individuals, but Renfew & Bahn (2000:9f) claim to discover some convergence with classical 
“processural” archaeology on this point.  
Let us suppose, just for a moment, that what Fagan really wants to say, is that archaeology 
is some particular method, which can be used when the more direct method of simply “reading 
the text” is not available: that is, a way of recovering old artefacts, usually by means of 
excavation. As a complete characterization of archaeology this will of course not do. Digging is 
simply the first (or perhaps some middle part) of the endeavor called archaeology. It involves a 
lot of other methods, for reconstruction as well as analysis, from carbon dating to experimental 
archaeology. Yet it seems to me that it is the only operation that really singles out archaeology. 
Without excavation archaeology is not archaeology. As an enterprise, archaeology is not defined 
by any particular domain, or any point of view. It is defined by a method, which is not even a 
method of analyzing, but of acquiring, the artefacts that it turns into its object of study.  
For the moment, it does not matter whether I might convince any archaeologist about the 
correctness of my observations. But the preceding discussion clearly shows that something 
being a science is much more a social than an epistemological fact. Saussure’ idea of there being 
some kind of system of the sciences within which the position of semiotics is already prepared 
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now seems rather ingenuous, and so does my own classification of the sciences into those 
based on divisions into domains and those adopting a particular point of view.  
I still think it would be useful for semiotics to be recognized as a science. It would then 
gain some of the coherence and the focus it still seems to be lacking. In some respects, 
however, I might have been much more on the right track in an earlier publication (Sonesson 
1989a, I.1.), where I suggested that semiotics could perhaps best be viewed as a series of 
entangled strains of problem areas making up a continuous discussion extending through the 
centuries, and that is was only by taking a retrospective view of (some restricted part of) this 
mesh, that semiotics could be defined a posteriori, for instance as I did in earlier paragraphs. 
From an epistemological point of view, nothing would change. This research tradition would still 
be characterized by its peculiar point of view. And it would not be equivalent to a “doctrine of 
signs”. It would be much more like a discussion: a network of problems branching out ever 
further through the centuries. In the following, when I talk about semiotics as a science, it 
should be understood in this sense. Indeed, I would like to claim that a science is simply a 
research tradition, in the above-defined sense, which has been institutionalized within society. 
Meta-analyses in our time: Semiotics and Cognitive Science 
To say that something becomes a science because of social reasons is not to suggest that those 
reasons are necessarily superficial, the result of power games and nepotism. In the case of 
semiotics, it may simply be the case that semiotics has so far failed to demonstrate its 
usefulness to wider groups within society. However, society as such is certainly also at stake: for 
some reason, the fortune of semiotics has been very different in Latin, and in particular Latin 
American, countries, than in the Anglo-Saxon, and more generally Germanic, world. People in 
the latter part of the world would no doubt tend to think that this is so because Latin culture is 
more susceptible to intellectual fads. There may be some truth in this, if semiotics is identified 
with intellectual fashion statements such as structuralism, post-structuralism, and post-
modernism. But this is a very limited, and uninteresting, way of looking at semiotics.  
It might be useful here to contrast semiotics with another brand of “meta-analysis” which 
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has met with more luck in the contemporary world, at least in the sphere under Anglo-Saxon 
influence: cognitive science. Like semiotics, cognitive science is often conceived as an 
interdisciplinary perspective that sometimes (no doubt more often than semiotics) has gained 
the position of an independent discipline. Curiously, it might be argued that cognitive science 
and semiotics cover more or less the same domain of knowledge – or rather, to apply the 
observations made above, take a very similar point of view on the world. This in itself is 
controversial, since semiotics and cognitive science offer very different characterizations of 
their domain (or, strictly speaking, the point of view taken on the domain). In some sense, 
however, both are concerned with the way in which the world described by the natural sciences 
appears to humans beings and perhaps also to other animals and some robots. Cognitive 
science puts the emphasis on the place of the appearance of this world, the mental domain 
(although some of its exponents would not even recognize the mind as such, but would rather 
talk about the brain and/or the computer), and on its characteristic operation, cognition; and 
semiotics insists on the transformations that the physical world suffers by being endowed with 
meaning. Indeed, in an earlier phase, cognitive science seemed more susceptible of being 
described by a simple model: the mind as computer. At present, however, even cognitive 
science has several models, one of which could be described as involving the mind as brain. 
The disciplinary history of these two approaches has been very different. Cognitive science 
is often described as the result of joining together the knowledge base of rather disparate 
empirical disciplines such as linguistics, cognitive psychology, philosophy, biology, and computer 
science. Thus, instead of one research tradition connected through the ages, cognitive science 
represents a very recent intermingling of several research-traditions having developed 
separately until a few decades ago. Semiotics has, in a more classical way, developed out of the 
amorphous mass of philosophy, and still has some problems encountering its empirical basis. It 
might be suggested that the basic concept of semiotics is the sign, whereas that of cognitive 
science is representation – even though there is a long tradition in semiotics for rejecting the 
sign concept, and recent cognitive science has marked its distances to the notion of 
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representation.x From the point of view of methods, semiotics is generally speaking stuck 
between the analysis of single ”texts “ and theory construction, whereas cognitive science is 
closer to relying on experimental methods (including, of course, computer simulation). These 
differences partly may explain why semiotics and cognitive science rarely are on speaking terms. 
It does not make sense nowadays to invoke ”cognitive science” as a whole. Cognitive 
science can be practiced, and indeed has historically been practiced, from very different points 
of views. There is some paradox to the very name “cognitive science”, because its initial aim was 
to do away with cognition, and indeed consciousness, as we know it. Indeed, the fact that 
mental life could be simulated on a computer was supposed to show that mental notions could 
be dispensed with altogether. Consciousness was, in this view, not in any way more difficult to 
explain than the possibility of having snippets of code making the same kind of calculations as 
the human brain. Jerry Fodor’s (1987) argument for the ”language of thought” is the most 
explicit version of this point of view. And this conception is still very influential within cognitive 
science in the form of Daniel Dennett’s (1987) idea about the ”intentional stance”: that human 
beings simply work like computers, with the added twist that they, for no useful reason at all, 
happen to think they are conscious.  
At some point, some researchers within the cognitive science tradition realized, not only 
that human beings could not really function outside the context of a human life world, and 
without taking their bearings on their outside bodily form, but that this was true also of 
computers able to simulate or accomplish some of the operations typical of human beings. This 
brings us to the notions of ”situatedness”, which has henceforth played an important role in 
cognitive science, and also to the complementary notion of ”embodiment”. Too much should 
not be made of these notions, however, because, as mentioned above, they apply to computers 
as well as to human beings. It is no doubt true that they served to bring inspirations from 
phenomenology and other traditions involved with consciousness into the fold of cognitive 
science, which is in itself a remarkable feat, if we remember that, before that, many 
phenomenologists, such as most famously Hubert Dreyfus, and a notable representative of the 
British style of the philosophy of mind such as John Searle, were violently opposed to cognitive 
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science. However, both situatedness and embodiment can be given – and have been given – 
other, more mechanistic, interpretations. The preoccupations with notions such as agency, 
intentions, consciousness, empathy, intersubjectivity, etc., are typical of ”consciousness 
studies”, such as practiced, for instance, by Evan Thompson (2007), Shaun Gallagher (2005), Dan 
Zahavi and a few others, but not of cognitive science as a whole. In fact, these notions are 
anathema to much of cognitive science, both in its classical version and, in a more implicit and 
confused way, in what nowadays may be described as mainstream cognitive science, associated 
with the work of Lakoff and Johnson, Dennett, Fodor, etc.xi 
To Lucy Suchman (1987) and her followers, the term ”situated” expressed a need to take 
the context into account. So does of course the term ”embodiment”, since our own body is the 
primary context of all our actions. ”Embodiment” is no doubt a more precise term than 
”context”, and perhaps ”situadedness” can be made to be that too, but then it has to be 
specifically defined. In any case, even if ”situated” and ”embodied cognition” are fashionable 
terms at present, mainstream cognitive science still does not seem to take them in the direction 
of consciousness studies. The body which forms the context is not the body as lived, that is, as a 
meaning, but the body as studied in the neurosciences. Lakoff, Johnson, Rohrer, and their likes 
today form the core of what is meant by mainstream cognitive science. Although their work is 
extremely confused and contradictory (as shown most clearly by Haser 2005), and even though 
it contains superficial references to part of the phenomenological tradition, a close reading of, 
in particular, their most recent publications, shows that in actual fact, they are back at a 
conception identical in practice to that of classical cognitive science, with the brain being 
substituted for the computer. As soon as they get down to business, the body they are talking 
about is reduced to the neurons and synapses of the brain. Thus, embodiment, in this tradition 
is certainly not part of context. This is also true if their work is interpreted in terms of the kind of 
influence they have had. 
Another related problem derives from the term ”cognitive” as such, as is appears in the 
name of the enterprise. In the traditional discipline of cognitive psychology, and in the 
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psychology of development, as, for instance, in the Piaget tradition, the term ”cognitive” has a 
rather clear, well circumscribed meaning, being opposed, notably, to perception, unconscious 
processes, and probably empathy in most senses of the term. At least prototypically, or as a goal 
state, it involves rational operations, such as those that are characteristic of argumentation or 
problem solving. Although I am not aware of any explicit definition of the term within cognitive 
science, it is clear that the term ”cognitive” here has taken on a much vaster, or much more 
unclear, meaning: originally, it corresponded to everything which could be simulated by a 
”cognitive device” such as a computer, and nowadays, it appears to stand for anything which 
can be localized in the brain. According to the “language of thought” hypothesis (first 
formulated by Fodor), even categorical perception and other elementary perceptual operations 
are based on cognition. Contemporary representatives of cognitive sciences such as Lakoff and 
Johnson would seem to claim that also thinking in a more traditional science might be reduced 
to very simple operations, in which case “cognitive science” becomes a misnomer. 
In the end, then, what we do need, is some kind of meta-analysis: as Bouissac (1999a: 4) 
put is so well, we need a procedure which “consists in reading through a large number of 
specialized scientific publications, selected among the published literature in one or several 
domains of inquiry, and of relating the partial results within a more encompassing model than 
the ones that are held by the various specialists concerned”. No doubt cognitive science, by 
definition, has been better at this than semiotics, because it is characterized by the confluence 
of various earlier research traditions, whereas semiotics has too long been hampered by the 
autonomy postulate, taken over from Sassurean and Chomskyan linguistics. For my part, I have 
always sided with cognitive science in this respect, even before it was invented. What cognitive 
science needs, however, is to take into account even more research traditions, one of which is 
no doubt semiotics. However, meta-analysis taking a semiotic as well as a cognitive point of 
view might perhaps better be called semiotics. In the end, there may be no meaning without 
cognition, and no cognition without meaning, at least given the wide definition of cognition 
characteristic of cognitive science. It might perhaps be said that semiotics differs from cognitive 
science simply by putting the emphasis on meaning rather than cognition. 
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Cognitive semiotics as a new paradigm 
Cognitive semiotics – or, perhaps better, semiotic cognitive science, as Terrence Deacon has 
suggested (only orally, I believe) –, which aims to bring together the knowledge base and 
models of cognitive science and semiotics, seems to have been invented several times over, 
probably because it is needed. What seems to be lacking, most of the time, in semiotics, is real 
empirical research. What is severely missing in cognitive science is a conception of meaning. 
The kind of cognitive science with which I here would like to organize an encounter is the 
brand whose real epistemological horizon is phenomenology, in its classical Husserlean form as 
well as in its recent versions within consciousness studies – and Searle, whose version of the 
philosophy of mind is to a large extent either crypto-phenomenological or a parallel 
development arriving at the same general conclusions. But it is also the kind of cognitive science 
which continues the tradition of cognitive psychology from Bartlett to Neisser. It is the kind of 
cognitive science which also relies on experiment. 
Semiotics would have nothing to offer cognitive science, if it were only a model or a 
method, or a philosophical standpoint. Above, I have argued that semiotics cannot be 
considered to be some kind of method, a model, a particular philosophical tradition, or even an 
“interdisciplinary perspective”, whatever that may mean; nor is it simply a critique of ideology 
or, in Paul Bouissac’s (1999) term, a “meta-analysis”; but it must be taken to be a science in its 
own right (cf. Sonesson 1992a; 1996; 2004-06). The most obvious reason for this is, as we saw, 
that semiotics, if it is not erroneously identified with French structuralism, can be seen to have 
been using many different models and methods, as well as being practiced from different 
philosophical points of view. And it is not simply a “meta-analysis” or some other kind of 
“interdisciplinary perspective”, because that does not tell us anything about its originality. It is 
interdisciplinary and meta-analytical with a twist, because it takes meaning as its perspective on 
the world. 
On the other hand, there have recently been some encouraging developments within 
cognitive science which, no doubt with some exaggeration, may be qualified as a “semiotic 
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turn”: an interest in meaning as such, in particular as it has developed, ontogenetically and, in 
particular, phylogenetically, in the human species and, to some extent, in other animals and 
animal-like machines. Terrence Deacon (1997) is a researcher in neuroscience whose work has 
been particularly acclaimed within cognitive science. Yet he has chosen to express some of his 
main arguments in a terminology taken over from Peirce, who is perhaps the principal cultural 
hero of semiotics.xii Not only Deacon, both other scholars interested in the specificity of human 
nature now put their emphasis on the concept of sign (which they normally term “symbol”, 
using this word is a sense in which we will not employ it here). This is true, in a very general 
sense, of Donald’s (1991) stages of episodic, mimetic, mythic and theoretical culture. It seems to 
apply even more to Tomasello (1999), less, in the end, because of his epigraphs taken from 
classical semioticians such as Peirce and Mead as well as Bakhtin and Vygotsky, than because of 
the general thrust of his analysis, which consists in separating true instances of interpreting 
actions as intentional from those which may merely appear to be such. Building on the 
aforementioned works, Jordan Zlatev (2002, 2003) is explicitly concerned with the conditions 
for the emergence of higher levels of meaning involving “mimesis” and language, from more 
basic ones, characteristic of all biological systems (life forms), such as “cues” and “associations. 
Interestingly, there has also been an attempt at a true “cognitive science turn” in 
semiotics, most clearly represented by Thomas Daddesio (1995), who has however not created 
any true following. Daddesio does try to absorb the empirical knowledge base of cognitive 
science into semiotics, and he does seem to side with the consciousness studies strand in 
cognitive science, at least in some passages, though he mistakes Lakoff & Johnson for its 
representatives. His main argument for having recourse to cognitive science, however, seems 
somewhat confused to me: when he criticizes semiotics for leaving out mental concepts, he 
puts on the same level the physicalist reductionism of behaviorism and the recognition, on the 
part of the tradition of Saussure, Cassirer, Husserl, the Prague school, and others, that there is 
also a third level of meaning, the social one – which does not exclude the mental world as its 
mode of access.xiii The latter, contrary to the former, makes of semiosis in the most central 
sense of the term: the intersubjective structures which make meaning possible (Cf. below on 
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semiotics in relation to rhetoric and hermeneutics). In many other ways, however, Daddesio’s 
contribution has been undeservedly neglected. In fact, he is of course quite right in emphasing 
the correlation of intersubjective structures (language as Saussurean langue) and subjective 
access (language as "competence", less in the sense of Chomsky that that of psycholinguistics). 
Daddesio would thus seem to associate semiotics with a particular philosophical 
standpoint. But this is a point of view which cannot be sustained. As I agued above against Eco 
(1988: 323ff) the fact of there being different semiotical points of view can hardly be taken to 
demonstrate that semiotics is a particular branch of philosophy; for, at the very least, this would 
show that semiotics is a class of different philosophical and/or scientific activities. However, as 
we saw above, it would be even more natural to conclude that, just as sociology, psychology, 
archaeology, literary history, and so on, semiotics can be practiced from the point of view of 
different philosophical conceptions. Thus, there may be a structuralist semiotics, a nominalist 
semiotics, a phenomenological semiotics, and so on – just as there may be, for instance, a 
processural and a post-processural archaeology, a positivist and a post-modernist art history, 
and so on. The kind of semiotics which I propose, which would permit us to organize an 
encounter with cognitive science of the consciousness studies brand, in particular, is a decidedly 
phenomenological and empirical semiotics. 
This is why, in the end, what we need is some kind of meta-analysis, i.e. a procedure 
which “consists in reading through a large number of specialised scientific publications, selected 
among the published literature in one or several domains of inquiry, and of relating the partial 
results within a more encompassing model than the ones that are held by the various specialists 
concerned” (Bouissac 1999: 4).  We know that cognitive science, because of being a confluence 
of various earlier research traditions, has been better at realizing this task, whereas semiotics 
has too long been hampered by the autonomy postulate, intitiated by Sassurean and 
Chomskyan linguistics. Unlike most of the venerable semiotic tradition, I have always argued 
against the autonomy postulate, basing my own work to a large measure on an interpretation of 
experimental results (most notably in Sonesson 1989). In that sense, without using the term, I 
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consider myself to be one of the inventors of cognitive semiotics. However, in some respects, 
scholars such as René Lindekens and Martin Krampen, who already in the heyday of 
structuralism set up their own experimental studies, basing themselves on semiotic models, 
may have even more claim to that title. 
A case in point could be Sven Arvidson's (2006) attempt to show the relevance to 
experimental studies of attention of the phenomenologically derived categories of theme, 
thematic field (which Arvidson calls contexts), and margin, which according to Gurwisch divides 
any possible field of consciousness, perhaps more adequately characterized by Arvidson as the 
sphere of attention. Interestingly, he does so in order to show the importance of 
phenomenology to cognitive science (and thus, even more, I would argue, to cognitive 
semiotics). The thematic field, according to Gurwitsch, is that part of what is present to 
consciousness which is connected to the theme of attention in an intrinsic way (itself, as 
becomes clear in Arvidson's book, a notion which needs elucidation), while the margin is all that 
is simply co-present (notably the stream of consciousness as a whole in time, the body of the 
subject, and the world of perception) without being connected to the theme. Arvidson is quite 
right in claiming that this is an important dimension of consciousness which is neglected in 
empirical studies, but when he claims that this division is either implicitly present in 
experimental studies, or would explain their findings better, he is much less convincing. In fact, 
the experimental studies that he quotes seem to be concerned with other aspects of 
consciousness, which are at least not sufficiently explained by Gurwitsch's division. Indeed, he 
often seems to take for granted that "context" (which is Arvidson's terms for Gurwitsch's 
thematic field) is used in the same sense in the experiments by psychologists ignorant of 
Gurwitsch's work. This goes a long way to show that, if you want experiments to tell us anything 
about phenomenological (and/or semiotical) notions, you have to design your own experiments. 
What cognitive science needs, on the other hand, is to take into account even more 
research traditions, one of which is no doubt semiotics. However, meta-analysis taking a 
semiotic as well as a cognitive point of view might perhaps better be called cognitive semiotics. 
In the end, there may be no meaning without cognition, and no cognition without meaning, at 
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least given the wide definition of cognition characteristic of cognitive science.xiv Where 
semiotics puts the emphasis on meaning, cognitive science, as we have seen, centres its 
attention on cognition (however widely redefined). However, by using such a term as cognitive 
semiotics, I am clearly implying that semiotics it not just any tradition worthy of taking into 
account in a reformed cognitive science. Such a term clearly involves taking for granted that 
meaning is the primary issue of human beings and, beyond that, of all life-forms. From the point 
of view of semiotics, cognitive semiotics is rather a perspective from which semiotics may be 
elaborated. Without semiotics, cognitive science is not complete. 
But even though general semiotics must feature meta-analysis in an essential way, it 
should not be viewed as simply a tradition within philosophy. As Peirce said, we have to get out 
of the philosophical soup shops. Let us now turn to consider some of philosophical residue left 
in the tureen. 
From Phenomenology to Ecological semiotics 
Just like (French) structuralism was semiotics with a particular epistemological slant, cognitive 
science so far often has been a study of cognition equipped with a particular epistemology. 
Basically, French structuralism was characterized by a positivistic conception of the world and of 
scientific method, taken over less from Saussure than coming out the subsequent development 
of linguistics prior to the advent of Chomsky and forming the background of distributionalism 
and behaviorism. As all French intellectual fads at the time, Structuralism (in this sense) 
obviously also had to take Freud and Marx into account, which could only be done by tempering 
the positivist conception, or rather, concomitantly rendering it rigid and inoperant. Something 
which is less well-known, however, is that Structuralism, appearing on the French intellectual 
scene, also had to define itself in relation to (Husserlean) phenomenology, at least in its French, 
subjectivist, variety, known as Existentialism. At least the early work of such well-known French 
structuralists as Greimas, Barthes, and Foucault contains explicit phenomenological references. 
None of them really reflected on the epistemological incompatibility of phenomenology and 
positivism (though at least Foucault clearly marked his distances to phenomenology later). 
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Some later semioticians, such as Jacques Fontanille and Jean Petitot, have later returned to the 
phenomenological tradition (though using it, it seems to me, in a merely decorative way). At the 
same time, however, semiotics generally has largely grown out of the structuralist strait-jacket 
(although I feel rather lonely having tried to take into account the rich intellectual yield of 
structuralism, as well as showing what was wrong with this epistemological stance). 
From this point of view, cognitive science still seems to remain at the stage of structuralist 
semiotics. It is a meta-analysis determined by the computer-metaphor, both as a way of 
constructing models, and (probably less) as a method of analysis known as simulation. No 
doubt, while early cognitive science was entirely dependent on the idea of the mind as a 
computer, functioning on the model of extant computer programs, recent decades has seen the 
advent of computer programs, called “neural networks”, constructed so as to function as 
models of the mind, identified with the brain, or at least as models of some aspects of brain 
functioning. This is perhaps the sense in which Pinker (1997; 2002) suggests that the idea of the 
mind as computation is wider than the “computer metaphor”. At least for some thinkers within 
this tradition, this has prompted the question of how the mind relates to the brain, or, in other 
terms, the problem of explaining the “personal level” from the “subpersonal level”. Some 
neurologists within the cognitive science framework have seen the necessity of accounting for 
“qualia”, i.e. the mind as experienced by a subject (Edelman & Tonini 2000), and philosophers 
operating within the same frames have tried to map commonsense psychology to brain 
functioning, often in terms of computer models (Bermúdez 2005). This should really bring 
cognitive science closer to phenomenology, even though such as rapprochement has only been 
suggested in rare instances so far (Gallagher 2005; Thompson 2007, Zahavi 2005). The lack of 
input from phenomenology and other philosophical traditions current during the turn of the 
19th century is clearly apparent in the discussion between “simulation theory” and “theory 
theory” concerning the relation between Ego and Alter (strange to say, even in Gallagher 
2005).xv 
The task of phenomenology, as Husserl saw it, was to explain the possibility of human 
beings having knowledge of the world; as a philosophical endeavor, phenomenology is about 
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the way the world of our experience is “constituted”. As a contrast, psychology is not about the 
world, but about the subject experiencing the world. However, every finding in 
phenomenological philosophy, Husserl claims has a parallel in phenomenological psychology, 
which thus could be considered a tradition within psychological science (cf. Husserl 1962; 
Gurwitsch 1974). If consciousness is a relation connecting the subject and the world, then 
phenomenology is concerned with the objective pole and psychology is about the subjective 
one. It is often forgotten that Husserl not only inspired but also himself was inspired by the 
Gestalt psychologists. Close followers of Husserl such as, most notably, Gurwitsch (1957, 1966), 
were as much involved with phenomenological psychology as with philosophy and discussed the 
findings not only of the psychology of perception but of contemporary contributors to 
neurobiology such as Gelb and Goldstein. Also the early Merleau–Ponty was, in this respect, an 
exponent of phenomenological psychology.  
Being a neurologist, Edelman (1992) clearly does not discover the body from the horizon 
of consciousness, like a phenomenologist, but quite the opposite, he implies that the mind 
cannot be divorced from the body. In a sense, this is hardly controversial: unlike those 
hypothetical angels postulated by Max Scheler, human beings can only boast a mind as long as 
they have a body. But, if this is true in the order of existence, it is not necessarily so from the 
point of view of investigation. After all, Brentano (1885) did not use a scalpel, much less fMRI, to 
discover the property of intentionality (in the sense of directedness), which Edelman recognizes 
as an irreducible characteristic of consciousness; nor did James (1890) find any of those 
“Jamesian properties” of consciousness repeatedly mentioned by Edelman in such a way. 
Indeed, far from being “a deliberately non-scientific set of reflections on consciousness and 
existence” (Edelman 1992: 159), phenomenology started out from the fact of intentionality and 
attempted to probe ever deeper into its ramifications, in order to rediscover and amplify those 
very Jamesian properties of consciousness mentioned by Edelman. Husserl and Gurwitsch may 
have been wrong to think of phenomenology as a discipline completely separate from biology 
and psychology, but the relative disconnection of phenomenological reflections, like those of 
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Brentano and James, from biological knowledge has no doubt borne rich intellectual fruit. If “a 
biologically based theory of mind” can in some respects “invigorate” phenomenology, the 
opposite is certainly just as true. 
It is, no doubt, phenomenology in the sense of phenomenological psychology which is of 
relevance here: it is in this sense that I think that, together with semiotics, phenomenology 
should participate in the confluence of research traditions making up cognitive science.xvi 
Personally, I also have some sympathy for phenomenology as a philosophical stance (though not 
in the sense of transcendental idealism), but this is less essential in the present context. 
Phenomenology, like semiotics, takes as its point of departure the way things make sense 
to us, that is, how they mean. In this, very broad sense, phenomenology accomplishes a 
semiotical reduction: things are considered only from the point of view of their having meaning 
to us (which might be people of a particular culture or subgroup, or humankind in general). 
From a phenomenological point of view, there is, in a sense, no way of overcoming the divide 
between the mind and the world formulated by Descartes, for Descartes did not invent it: it is 
intrinsic to that phenomenon which, in Descartes’ own words, is the most widely distributed in 
the world: common sense.  
Common sense is not notorious for being right: but if we ask ourselves how the body (and 
the rest of the world) makes sense to us, then common sense is our very subject matter. Even 
so, common sense gives rise to an apparent contradiction: my body is necessarily experienced 
through my consciousness, but in my consciousness it is experienced as being outside of it.xvii All 
post-Cartesian mediations, from those of Husserl to those of Merleau-Ponty, have been 
concerned to account for this paradox. To do so, it is necessary to accomplish a painstaking 
analysis (of which there can be no better example than the posthumous papers of Husserl 
himself, together with the – also largely posthumous – works of Peirce) of all those structures of 
the mind that are normally at the margin of consciousness. Since this is a question of 
discovering the way in which that which has a meaning means, there is no other way of 
achieving it, even if it is an extremely fallible enterprise. 
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In this sense, as I have argued above, as well as elsewhere (Sonesson 1989: 27ff), all 
human and social sciences which aspire to discover regularities, such as linguistics and other 
semiotic sciences, necessarily start out from phenomenology – and we should be happy if those 
phenomenological investigations sometime manage to be as meticulous as those of Husserl and 
Gurwitsch.  
This common sense world from which all analysis of meaning must start out was 
characterized by Husserl as the Lifeworld, paraphrased by the later phenomenologist Alfred 
Schütz as the world taken for granted. The Lifeworld, in this sense, must comprise both what, in 
recent cognitive science, is known as “naive physics” (what we, as members of the human race, 
not as students of the natural sciences, believe about the physical world) and “common sense 
psychology” (what we believe about ourselves other persons). The psychologist James Gibson, 
who sometimes repeated Husserl’s very words in describing what he called “ecological 
psychology” (what we must take for granted about the environment in order to be able to 
perceive the world as we do), is more obviously concerned with the naive physics parts. Taking 
my clue from Gibson, I have called this kind of study, prefigured by both Husserl and Gibson, 
ecological semiotics (cf. Sonesson 1993a, 1994a, 1996a, 1997a, 1999a). However, as 
semioticians we still feel that something is lacking here: the world of signs itself. In the terms of 
Karl Popper (prefigured by many other authors), our experience is not only made up of subjects 
with consciousness (World 2) and the world of physics (World 1), but also of organism-
independent structures such as languages and other semiotic resources (World 3). All access to 
these worlds is of course only possible from within World 2. And yet World 3 has its own 
existence, just as well as World 1.xviii 
The three sciences of communication: rhetoric, hermeneutics, semiotics 
Like semiotics, rhetoric and hermeneutics may be viewed as age-old research traditions in 
search of scientific status. The case of rhetoric is certainly somewhat different from the others: 
it was a kind of epistemé (that is a science, not simply an art, a techné), already in Antiquity, and 
it remained so through the Middle Ages, when it was part of the Trivium, and beyond that at 
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least until the Enlightenment, when Vico, for instance, was a professor of rhetoric. More 
recently, is has again become a discipline occupying a position at the university, though, like in 
the Middle Ages, it tends to be reduced to a techné, in the Aristotelian sense, that is, merely a 
set of practical precepts which are taught to the students and not questioned, rather than a 
science transforming this “art” into explicit knowledge, as suggested by Aristotle. Only in the 
work of the two Belgian schools of new rhetoric, that of Perelman, and that of Groupe µ, which 
is semiotically informed, has rhetoric taken on some of the trappings of a science.xix 
As for hermeneutics, when it first emerged in Late Antiquity, and then again during the 
Middle Ages, it was certainly an art in the Aristotelian sense, featuring a series of guidelines for 
the interpretation of religious texts, to which later the canon of Antiquity was added. 
Hermeneutics in the Renaissance sense, on the other hand, remained a techné, but one which 
was alimented by historical and critical research, permitting the restitution of the true text. At 
least since Schleiermacher and Dilthey, however, hermeneutics rather seems to have been 
transformed into a philosophical tradition, particularly tainted by the Heideggerean conception 
of thinking, although it also has been given its own status within the social sciences, mainly 
thanks to the contribution of Habermas. Interestingly, within the recent hermeneutic tradition, 
hermeneutics and rhetoric have appeared as some kind of sister sciences (most explicitly 
perhaps in the work of Gadamer), though very little is generally said about the latter.xx  
I want to suggest that this sisterhood could more conveniently be expanded so as to 
comprehend also a third member, which is of course semiotics. The resulting trinity is not the 
one proposed by Popper (and even less that of Peirce): both hermeneutics and rhetoric are 
concerned with the Popperean World 2, that of the subjects, but semiotics is of course mainly 
concerned with World 3, that of organism-independent artefacts. Instead, rhetoric, 
hermeneutics, and semiotics occupy different positions in relation to the process of 
communication. They may be said to be different sciences of communication taking different 
points of view on the communication process. But in order to see this, we have to go beyond 
the model of communication propounded by the mathematical theory of information, which is 
too often taken for granted outside and inside of semiotics. 
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Even today all semiotic theory relies, more or less explicitly, on the communication model 
derived from the mathematical theory of information, which was designed to describe a few, by 
now rather old-fashioned, technological means of communication, telegraphy and radio, and in 
particular to devise remedies to the loss of information often occurring during transportation. 
Largely because of the influence of Jakobson (1960) and Eco (1976; 1977), this model has been 
used inside semiotics as a model of all communication, all signification, and of all kinds of 
semiosis. 
This practice has produced at least two symmetrical, equally negative, consequences: by 
reducing all kinds of semiosis to the mass media kind, in particular to that employed by radio 
and telegraphy, we become unable to understand the peculiarity of more direct forms of 
communication; and by treating all semiosis as being on a par, we deprive ourselves of the 
means to understand the intricacies added to direct communication by means of different 
varieties of technological mediation. Beyond this, we may even discover a third, even more 
serious consequence: by projecting the communication model onto each and every form for 
conveying meaning, we lose sight of that which is really common to all kinds of semiosis 
I will here suggest a model of communication (Figure 1), which takes the basic operation 
of communicating to be, not transference in space, or translation into another code, but the act 
of interpretation, which supposes an active contribution on the part of the receiver, as well as 
on that of the sender, the receiver being sometimes more, and sometimes less involved than 
the sender. Indeed, the first result of a process of communication is to produce a task of 
perception for the receiver, who has to have the means of accomplishing this task.  
We could start be separating the process of communication into three acts which do not 
have to take place at the same time and/or in the same space: the act of producing the artifact, 
the act of presenting into to the receiver, and the act of receiving it. The whole of this process 
supposes there to be some pool of knowledge held in common by the sender and the receiver, 
or rather, one pool of knowledge of the sender and one pool of knowledge of the receiver 
which, even in the most favorable case, can only partly overlap. If the message is sender-
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adapted, it is the task of the receiver to recover the part of the message that is not given in his 
pool of knowledge. This is a typically hermeneutic task. On the other hand, if the message is 
receiver-adapter, it is the task of the sender to recover the part of the message possibly being 
understood by the receiver. This is an elementary rhetorical operation. Of course, rhetoric is 
also about recovering such elements of the message that may possibly be not only understood 
but also convincing to the receiver, but conviction is based on understanding (in some sense). 
There could also be a corresponding hermeneutical operation, if hermeneutics is taken to 


















Figure 1. The communication model divided into three scientific perspectives 
 
More simply, looked at from this angle, rhetoric is concerned with the way of creating the 
message, so as to win the adherence of the other, and hermeneutics is involved with the task of 
recovering what the other wanted to say (or what a particular work really may be taken to 
mean). In between the position of Ego and Alter, semiotics has to elucidate what resources are 
at the disposal of both participants in the process of communication. If rhetoric, semiotics and 
hermeneutic are sister sciences, it makes sense, however, to ask semiotics to take care of the 
other sisters. A semiotically informed rhetoric would ask what means are at our disposal for 
gaining the adherence of the other. Similarly, a semiotically informed hermeneutics would ask 
what resources there are for construing the meaning of a certain sender and/or a certain work. 
Could there then also be something like a hermeneutically and/or rhetorically informed 
semiotics? I think not. As research traditions, hermeneutics and rhetoric have a lot to teach 
semioticians. But they cannot redefine semiotics in an essential sense, in the way in which 
semiotics redefines hermeneutics and rhetoric. This is because, as against traditional 
hermeneutics (at least what is sometimes called the subjectist tradition), semiotics observes 
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that nobody can be understood but through the semiotic resources offered by a given society 
(including the very structures of sociality). In the same way, semiotics points out, against 
rhetoric as it is often practiced nowadays (though it would concord, in spirit at least, with the so 
much criticized rhetoric tradition of the 16th to the 19th century, which was restricted to the 
taxonomy of expressive devices, or elocutio) that nobody can express himself, except by means 
of the semiotic resources given in a particular society. This means that, not only is 
communication only possible as an interaction between sender and receiver, addresser and 
addressee, but that even this interaction cannot take place, but through the intermediary of 
signs and other meanings. But these meanings are really part of the world going beyond both 
addresser and addressee, the World 3 of Popperian ontology: that which is only given through 
consciousness, but has an existence independent of consciousness. 
 
Summary 
In this article, I have been delving into some things which have been said, or presupposed, 
about semiotics: it being a particular model, method, a current of thinking, some kind of 
interdisciplinary approach (which in reality tends to amount to being a synonym for 
interdisciplinarity tout court), or even a particular kind of philosophy. I have rejected all these 
alternatives, at least in their exclusive sense, as constituting too little, or too much, to be able to 
correspond to what semiotics is and has been. First of all, semiotics is a constellation of more or 
less interrelated thoughts and ideas, and objections and rejections of them, as well as 
developments and syntheses of them, which have been handed down through the centuries.  
This is the stuff sciences are made of, whether they are defined by a domain of study, such 
as geography or French studies, or by a particular perspective taken on everything, such as 
physics and chemistry, or sociology and psychology - or semiotics. To be a science, something 
must, in addition, be socially constituted as such. So far, it seems that semiotics has failed this 
trial, contrary to what Saussure predicted. Somewhat maliciously, I suggested that archeology, 
which seems to be an epistemological hodgepodge deprived of any coherence of perspective or 
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domain, is, on the contrary, a well-established science. Of course, cognitive science is another 
success story, although it started out from an absurd metaphor, and it was constituted out of 
the confluence of several pre-existing disciplines.  
Although semiotics has often been defined by its own proponents in confused and 
confusing ways, it seems, on the contrary, to be a rather coherent enterprise, when we attend 
to what has actually been done. So why was no Saussurean place prepared for us beforehand? 
This could be taken to suggest that there is something wrong with society (as there most 
certainly is in many other respects), but perhaps we must also recognize some failings of 
semiotics as a (prospective) science. We have done very well to use some kind of first persons 
approach, starting out from, though not necessary arriving at, the person doing the research, as 
in phenomenology. The study of artifacts (such as texts, pictures, etc.) have also been a valuable 
foray into meaning characteristic of classical semiotics, although it has often concerned too few 
object to be able to carry generalizations very far. But this can never be enough. It is only when 
we can design our own experiments, starting out from the models derived from semiotic theory 
that we can hope to make up a thriving discipline. I don't know if Cognitive semiotics is a good 
name for such an enterprise. But it is certainly a useful name for it at present. The marriage of 
semiotics and cognitive science (presented by phenemenology) is made in epistemological 
heaven. 
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i Pre-publication of a text meant to form the introduction of a book in progress. The argument has 
profited from discussion at the Semiotics Seminar at Lund University. 
ii Bouissac (1999a, b) also talks about four “ways of acquiring knowledge” within semiotics and 
elsewhere, which partly correspond to my division: “experiment” and “reasoning” has obvious parallels, 
“serendipity” would for me be something occurring at certain moments within the other strategies, and 
“meta-analysis” is an aspect which I have not mentioned, but to which I will turn below. 
iii Another variety of this thesis could be to present semiotics as a “critique of ideology”, which is a 
conception probably first formulated be Voločinov, and more famously repeated by Kristeva, but it is still 
found in Angenot 1985. This self-contradictory conception will not be further discussed here. 
iv There may of course also be many points of view within a science: Newtonean physics, relativity 
theory, and quark theory appear to be different points of view in contemporary physics. 
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v It is impossible to establish a consensus among all semioticians on what semiotics is all about; and 
many semioticians will not even care to define their discipline. However, if we attend less to definitions 
than to real research practice, and if we leave out those would-be semioticians who simply do not seem to 
be doing anything very new (those who merely go on doing art history, literary history, philosophy, logic, 
or whatever), it seems possible to isolate the smallest common denominators of the discipline.  
vi This is not to say that semiotic results must be formulated in terms of Hempel’s covering law (as 
has been claimed by some exponents of “New Archaeology”): we are referring to the distinction between 
nomothetic and idiographic descriptions in the more general sense of Rickert and Windelbrand. 
vii As will be obvious here, if not before, the present discussion relies heavily on a contrast between 
archaeology and semiotics, which I developed in a lecture, which has not been published, that formed part 
of a colloquium on semiotics and archaeology, organised at the Swedish Institute in Istanbul in December 
2 to 10, 2000. The reflections of archaeology here simply serve as an example, but they will be more 
directly relevant to our discussion in lecture two. 
viii From our point of view, this prompts the question: should we also add a “picture-aided 
archaeology”? And perhaps even further hybrids such as a “trace-aided archaeology”? 
ix 
 It has been argued that, although introductory text books give a different impression, most 
archaeology is really involved with historical times, that is, it is “historical archaeology” (Andrén 1997: 
12f). 
x 
 If this seems a paradoxical statement, I must refer the reader to Sonesson, in press, for its 
elucidation. 
xi My first tradition seems to correspond to what Thompson (2007:4ff) calls cognitivism, but the 
other two only overlap somewhat with Thomson’s “connectionism” and “embodied dynamicism”. 
xii Without trying in any way to diminish Deacon’s contribution – in fact, I find him very convincing 
whenever he is not having recourse to semiotic terminology -, I have earlier expressed serious misgivings 
about his way of using Peircean terms, because this serves to obscure both the central issues of semiotics, 
and those introduced by Deacon (Cf. Sonesson 2006). 
xiii 
 I am of course simplifying the issue: thus, there is a notable ambiguity in the work of Saussure 
between a social and an outright formalist interpretation. 
xiv According to the “language of thought” hypothesis (first formulated by Fodor) even categorical 
perception and other elementary perceptual operations are based on cognition. Contemporary 
representatives of cognitive sciences such as Lakoff and Johnson (on which more will be said in later 
lectures) would seem to think that also thinking in a more traditional science may be reduced to very 
simply operations, in which case “cognitive science” becomes a misnomer. “Cognition” appears to have 
changed meaning, standing simply for that which may be simulated on a computer. 
xv For a discussion of this tradition, which is useful even for those who are not able to agree with the 
Heideggeran conclusions (curious in this author), see Gurwitsch 1979 (written in 1931). 
xvi 
Cf. the remarks on Arvidson 2006 above! 
xvii Strictly speaking, this is not the problem of our own body, nor of the other, but the more general 
one of the external world, as pointed out by Gurwitsch (1979: 26f): but it is quite sufficient for us to note 
that it also applies to the body 
xviii 
 The nature and origin of organism-independent artifacts (which are of course independent of both 
matter and mind, both only in a limited sense) will be further discussed below, but for more a more 
complete discussion, see Sonesson 2007. 
xix For the history of rhetoric, see, for instance, Conley 1990 and Meyer 1999. More will be said 
about the two Belgian schools on new rhetoric in later lectures. An important theoretical contribution to 
rhetoric is of course also Ricœur (1975), although the author is more well-known form his 
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phenomenological and hermeneutical inspirations. 
xx An extensive overview of the hermeneutical tradition is found in Ferraris 2002.  
xxi The conception of communication presented here is very much indepted to the theories of the 
Prague and Tartu schools of semiotics, in particular as discussed in Sonesson 1999b. More will be said 
about this in later lectures. 
